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What is radicalism? 
 
What is radicalism? The question immediately begs its obverse: what is not radicalism? Or rather, 
what might falsely appear as, or make unsubstantiable claim to, ‘radicalism’?  
 
The term ‘radicalism’ implies a number of things, as many contributions to this volume will no 
doubt remark. On the one hand, it implies a commitment to fundamental change, change which 
changes whatever it changes ‘at the roots’. On the other, in the ordinary parlance of Western 
democratic politics, it implies a commitment to the historic goals of the Left. Of course, there has 
been and remains a powerful tradition of right-wing ‘radicalism’, but that is not our concern here. 
We will confine ourselves to thinking about the ‘radicalism’ in terms of a commitment to the 
historic goals of the Left - i.e. the elimination, as far as possible, of fundamental imbalances of 
power between different communities, classes and individuals - and in terms of a willingness to 
pursue that objective beyond the limits set by conventional political or cultural practice. This brings 
us back to the initial idea of ‘radicalism’ as a measure of how fundamental the change might be that 
one is willing to pursue.  
 
A problem emerges here already, however. Consider the implications of the word ‘fundamental’. It 
has its origins in the Latin ‘fundamen’, meaning ‘foundation’. In fact, one of the marked tendencies 
of ‘radical’ thought in recent decades has been the ‘anti-foundationalist’ and ‘anti-essentialist’ turn 
away from any conception of the social which would identify one element, institution or group as 
necessarily ‘fundamental’, foundational, determinant or constitutive of all others. What does it 
mean, then, to retain a conception of ‘radicalism’ in such a context?  
 
To answer this question, it is necessary to be clear about what is implied by such anti-essentialist 
conceptions of the social. Such an approach rejects the assumption that a single set of power 
relationships - such as relationships between classes, between genders, or between governors and 
governed - determines all others. But such an approach does not  necessarily deny that such 
different sets of relationships impinge upon each other. Rather, it stresses the dynamic and 
unpredictable nature of their mutual influence. Various terminologies have been mobilised in order 
to capture this quality of interrelation between different sets of dynamic power relations, 
understanding the social in terms of its ‘formations’ or ‘assemblages’, for example. 
 
 One thing these reflections might draw our attention to is the fact that of course, ‘radical’ does not 
share the etymology of ‘fundamental’. ‘Roots’, understood literally, are not the same thing as 
‘foundations’. Roots are organic elements without which a plant cannot survive, but which also 
cannot survive without the other elements of the plant and of the broader ecosystem in which it is 
located. Might ‘radicalism’ then be thought of in terms of a particular attentiveness to the 
interrelatedness of different elements of the social - even to the ‘ecological’ interaction between 
those elements and the wider geophysical and technological environment? (see Guattari 1989; 
Fuller 2005). Our suggestion here is that this might be a useful way of supplementing and 
complexifying the usual understanding of ‘radicalism’ as a measure of the dramatic and far-
reaching ambitions for change registered by a particular political position or project. At the same 
time, this suggestion itself draws attention to the issue of how to differentiate ‘dramatic’ and ‘far-
reaching’ ambitions from more limited ones: how is it possible to make such a distinction 
meaningfully today?  
 
 
Revolution Vs. Reform? 
 
Within an older paradigm, it might have been possible to differentiate the ‘radical’ from the non-
radical in terms of a relative degree of commitment to ‘revolution’: the classic distinction between 
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‘revolutionary’ and ‘reformist’ politics continues to inform much far-left political discourse to this 
day. The problems with this distinction are well-known, but worth re-iterating. Firstly, many uses of 
it rely upon a fixed historical narrative according to which revolution is the inevitable destiny of 
social change if it is not hampered or slowed down by distracting ‘reform’ (a hypothesis which has 
absolutely no historical evidence to support it). Even if such a strict conception of history is not in 
place, the distinction still assumes that it is possible to plot a straight line from a given present to an 
imagined future which can be determined as being, or not being, ‘revolutionary’ in nature. Such a 
perspective makes no sense in the context of an understanding of the social and its processes which 
accepts the radical unpredictability of complex ecologies, of which any human society is clearly an 
example. It is simply not possible to predict in advance whether a given course of action will or will 
not tend towards something like a revolution, unless that action is being taken in an obviously pre-
revolutionary situation. 
 
 This is not to say that nothing could remain of the ‘revolutionary’ spirit within such a perspective. 
A certain willingness to push change as far as it can go, and to intensify lines of transformation past 
those ‘tipping points’ which might alter the dynamics of the entire system, would still be a 
necessary element of any conceivable ‘radicalism’. For example, in a situation such as the UK in 
2008, where neoliberal hegemony has resulted in an almost unquestioned acceptance of the value of 
privatisation by most of the political class, such radicalism might be registered just as well by local 
campaigns to democratise public services without handing them to the commercial sector as by 
explicit commitments to socialism and class struggle. However, such campaigns would perhaps 
only deserve the epithet ‘radical’ if they were unwilling to limit their objectives to the mere defence 
of existing arrangements in a local context, and instead oriented themselves towards a longer-term 
and permanent intervention in the wider arrangement of power relationships in which they find 
themselves. The successful campaign against the privatisation of local government IT services in 




Such an orientation towards long-term and permanent intervention might best be understood as 
‘strategic’ in nature. In our view, the distinction between strategic and tactical interventions is a 
crucial one. A particular tendency in ‘radical’ thought - informed by de Certeau, Hakim Bey, 
certain immature strands of anarchism and some deeply confused  misreadings of Deleuze & 
Guattari - tends to assume that true radicalism can operate on a purely ‘tactical’ level, and that 
‘strategy’ must always be the property of authoritarian organisations and projects (de Certeau 1984; 
Bey 1991). Such a position inevitably ends up endorsing a range of ‘tactical’ manoeuvres which 
give expression to a ‘radical’ identity but have no apparent impact on power relationships at any 
level: examples of such ineffectual gestures include ‘subvertisements’, short-term squatting, 
conceptual art shows, or spectacular political ‘actions’ involving large numbers of arrests and no 
change whatsoever to the policies being protested. In fact, we are highly sympathetic to the 
creativity and dynamism of much such activity, and we would also share this tradition’s hostility 
towards rigid doctrine, party discipline and organisational authoritarianism. As should be clear from 
our rejection of the revolution / reform distinction, we do not believe that it is possible to formulate 
all-encompassing ‘strategies’ with determinate final goals for radical political projects. But at the 
same time, there can be no conception of radicalism as tending in the direction of ‘tipping points’ if 
there is no attention at all to the wider configurations in which particular actions are taken and no 
desire to intensify change in the direction of their possible transformation. Such an attention and 
desire can best be characterised as a ‘strategic orientation’.  
 
A strategic orientation, we are therefore suggesting, is what characterises genuine radicalism. This 
is, of course, a perspective very much in the Gramscian tradition (Gramsci 2000). From this point of 
view, it is possible to be thoroughly militant in one’s declared opposition to, say, capitalism, or 
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patriarchy, or imperialism, or whatever; but if that opposition is expressed in terms which have no 
hope or intention of persuading others to engage in similar opposition, no chance whatsoever of 
broadening and intensifying such opposition in the direction of some transformatory tipping-point, 
then it can be at best merely ‘tactical’ in nature, a mere statement of opposition which makes no 
impact upon the wider configuration of forces, and so is devoid of any real political efficacy. 
However, this is not to make a case for mild-mannered pragmatism, either. The distinction we are 
making is one which may at times be a very fine one: between, for example, the short-term 
occupation of a building which there is no hope of holding indefinitely (symbolic tactical gesture) 
and the establishment of a social centre as a permanent community resource (a clear strategic gain 




Our distinction would also be just as critical of an insufficiency of militancy as of an excess thereof. 
For example, one of the chronic problems facing the mainstream Left in Western Europe is the 
apparent inability of social democrats and their supporters to appreciate the sheer levels of sustained 
effort which would today be required to defend the remnants of the welfare state from creeping 
privatisation. Under conditions of global neoliberal hegemony, for example, free universal health 
care is not the ‘reasonable’ expectation that it was, but a radical demand only likely to be met by 
sustained militant action against that hegemony. Few politicians or voters of the ‘moderate’ 
European Left have yet grasped this fact.  
 
In fact, the dominant tendency amongst parties and governments of the social democratic Left in 
Europe, the US, and Australia in recent times has been the embrace of the technocratic programme 
of the ‘Third Way’, which claims to move beyond the political polarities of the modern era, 
occupying a pragmatic position from which to solve social problems efficiently, taking each in turn 
as a discrete technical problem to be addressed on its own terms. In the UK, at least, this is a 
position only really adopted by think tanks such as Demos and the IPPR. Government may mouth 
the pragmatist mantra ‘what matters is what works’, but in practice the commitment of UK 
governments to neoliberal programmes has often flown in the face of any objective measures of 
those programmes success in generating social benefits. But for the think tanks and the intellectual 
cadres in their wider orbit, including most professional political commentators, this pragmatist 
ideology has an absolutely paralysing effect, in effect reducing their policy programmes to a set of 
tactical proposals which make as little impact on the wider configuration of social forces as do the 
sermonising and self-publicity of self-identified ‘activists’. In fact, the consequence has been that 
the think tanks have been quite unable to make any critique of New Labour’s ideological 
conversion to neoliberalism, and have only seen their policies adopted when they happen to 
converge with its existing agenda. Without any aspiration to such critique, the think-tanks and 
NGOs have been unable to pull New Labour away from the influence of the corporate lobby and the 
‘Washington consensus’.  
 
Politics as technocratic tinkering, then, we are arguing, is no more effective than politics as pseudo-
radical posturing. For a politics to be radical involves attacking imbalances and concentrations of 
power wherever they are found; functioning with a well-developed understanding of the ‘ecologies’ 
- the relational contexts - in which such imbalances and concentrations exist; and operating 
strategically, for far-reaching change. We can think about what this means in practice by comparing 





There has been a great deal of policy innovation in the areas of recycling and green energy over the 
past decade. This is because they are seen as a way of addressing in a number of environmental 
problems, particularly climate change, and the potential problems generated by ‘peak oil’.  
 
Let us take one example: the act of buying a product such as the ‘Worn Again’ brand of trainer, 
made with a number of recycled components. In the UK this product became fairly high profile 
when it was worn by the leader of the Conservative party David Cameron as one of a number of 
attempts to ‘green’ his image. As a political move this is clearly not very ‘radical’ for a number of 
reasons.  The production of the shoe does not go very far in its attempt to reduce imbalances of 
power: whilst it uses recycled components, including London firemen’s uniforms, these are shipped 
to Tangxia in Southern China for production where, as even the Conservative-friendly UK tabloid 
the Daily Mail pointed out, workers are paid little and the local river is black with industrial 
pollution from shoe factories.
i
 Terra Plana who produces the expensive high-end shoes is not a co-
operative, a means by which wealth could be shared, nor does it use unionised labour. In fact Terra 
Plana specifies in its ethical policy that whilst it uses recycled materials it ‘does not have a code of 
conduct for its overseas production’
ii
. These are also expensive shoes and therefore are only 
available to an elite.  
 
Buying the Worn Again shoe as a political gesture is therefore not particularly radical. Whilst 
wearing the trainer works as a tactical move to promote recycling and the idea of green politics, it 
exemplifies a politics that offers environmentalism as a shopping option for the relatively 
privileged. Here Cameron’s wearing of the shoe is significant, as it echoes how the Conservative 
Party’s particular shade of green revolves round an ‘eco-aristocracy’ of millionaire 
environmentalists like Zac Goldsmith. Moreover, wearing Worn Again does not produce many 
significant moves towards equality because of its environmental effects and relatively elite 
approach. In ethical shopping terms, a more ‘radical’ clothing choice would be the US-based 
company No Sweat, which uses unionised labour to produce all its products, uses organic material 
in the local production of its shoes, and which have a very low profit mark-up, so being more 





But the purchase of a shoe is still on its own a relatively isolated gesture. We might therefore look 
elsewhere to find examples of a radical  politics of recycling. Consider, for example, the remarkable 
expansion of household recycling, the growth of which ‘has been of a kind that few would have 
predicted ten years ago’ (Murray, 2002: 32). In the UK, for example, recycling has become such a 
popular practice that it regularly tops the list of green facilities people want to see provided by local 
government. Household recycling has been described by waste guru Robin Murray as an example 
of ‘productive democracy’, because it involves a degree of collective work which members of the 
public are increasingly willing to engage if for a perceived ‘wider good’ (Murray 1999: 70). This 
has involved an innovative mobilisation of new constituencies. As Gay Hawkins puts it, some of the 
more inventive language around recycling has worked not by addressing a pre-existing public but 
by creating a new public that was ‘called into being through a vision of a contaminated world’ 
(Hawkins 2007: 64). 
 
The potential seeds of a radical politics exist in these practices of  ‘productive democracy’, which 
try to move towards creating environmental equalities, and do so on a very participative social 
basis. They are extended further and become more pronounced in their radicalism when the 
sentiments they have mobilised become used as a resource to extend further activity. And this, in 
effect, is what many ‘Zero Waste’ campaigns are doing. Zero Waste campaigns build on popular 
enthusiasm for recycling to extend green sensibilities outwards towards what is sometimes called 
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‘closed loop’ or ‘cradle-to-cradle’ environmental thinking (see Braungart and McDonough in IPPR 
and Green Alliance 2006: 12). Put simply, this emphasizes the idea of recycling as a continuous 
practice taking places across a wide range of interconnected social contexts, rather than imagining 
recycling as a series of isolated actions or events. It emphasizes the value of a ‘reduce, re-use, 
recycling’ attitude, of  clean production, of atmospheric protection and of resource conservation. 
Such ‘zero waste’ strategies have begun to be deployed by a number of areas including San 
Francisco, Bath and New Zealand (IPPR 2006 and Green Alliance: 6). Zero waste campaigns are 
radical activities in that they are strategic in their nature whilst mobilizing an understanding of the 
context they work within.  Importantly, they also work to publicly politicize previously taken-for-
granted areas of social life such as household consumption, retail, and small-scale manufacturing.  
 
Energy-Independence for All? 
 
We might take a different example of radical politics from the area of green energy generation. 
Getting a solar panel or wind turbine fitted on the roof of your house appears to perhaps be 
something of a radical gesture in the current social and environmental climate. But it remains the 
case that on its own it is not a particularly radical practice, as it is limited to the few people who can 
afford the cost of fitting solar panels or wind turbines, which at the time of writing in the UK 
remains prohibitively high.  
 
Of course it would not be helpful to dismiss such activities of middle-class people ‘doing what they 
can’ as useless, because as an environmentally useful practice it is more helpful than harmful. But a 
more radical politics around green energy in the UK involves campaigning for the UK government 
to adopt strong feed-in tariffs. ‘Feed-in tariffs’ are set prices which national and regional energy 
suppliers are legally obliged to pay for the power generated from renewable sources by domestic 
producers using household windmills, solar panels, or geothermal systems. Where progressive 
‘feed-in tariff’  policies are adopted, then  generating companies are obliged to pay more for such 
locally-produced renewable energies than for ‘dirty’ fuels. This system has been massively 
successful in increasing the proportion of renewable energy generated and used in countries like 
Germany, where the appeal of the extra income generated from feed-in tariffs is a powerful 
motivation to householders to generate their own renewable energy.  
 
To date, many western governments have pursued an environmental strategy which mainly seeks to 
shift the costs of environmentalism onto consumers: an approach that is sometimes termed ‘green 
governmentality’. By contrast, Germany’s use of feed-in tariffs stands out as a approach which tries 
to solve environmental problems on a collective basis (Forsyth and Young 2007; Luke 1999) while 
importantly addressing issues around energy generation at the level of production. Germany’s 
strong environmental record has come about through the radical green political movements that 
gave rise to the red-green coalition governments of the 1990s, which have left a deep impression on 
its political landscape (Schreurs 2002). Not simply using renewable energy, but campaigning so that 
everyone will be able to generate and use it, has beenone key characteristic of radical politics in this 
area.  
 
However, as some journalists have pointed out, such campaigns are finding it hard to get popular 
traction in the UK. In part, this is because the  the phrase ‘feed-in tariff’ is just not particularly 
catchy (Guardian 2008)! This is not a trivial issue, in fact. Rather it should focus our attention on 
the importance of understanding the contexts within which such campaigns exist and through which 
they attempt to build popularity; or, to put it in Felix Guattari’s terms, to the ‘mental, social and 
environmental ecologies’ within which any politics exists (Guattari 1989/2000).  
 
Another word for ‘mental, social and environmental ecology’ might just be ‘culture’, of course. 
From this point of view, it is important to attend to the cultural resonances and potentials of 
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particular programmes, policies, slogans and strategies. In the UK, popular green politics has been 
hamstrung by its lack of resonance with the deeply individualist political tradition of the country 
(especially Southern England) and its appeals to an uninspiring rhetoric of moral responsibility. In 
this context, a far better strategy would be to mobilise a rhetoric of independence and economy 
around the ideal of giving all householders the right to become energy-independent, and hence free 
from the vagaries of the energy market, which have produced massive, and massively unpopular, 
rises in household bills in recent years.   
 
Could such a rhetoric be linked successfully to a wider critique of the power relations which 
underpin our environmentally unsustainable economy? In fact, the issue of feed-in tariffs could be 
strategically linked to such an agenda if they were publicly connected with support for the  ‘Green 
New Deal’. The Green New Deal is a package of far-reaching proposals proposed by  brought 
together by a group of politicians, journalists, academics and the radical NGO, the New Economics 
Foundation. The Green New Deal, which suggests ways of tackling the credit, oil and climate 
crunch simultaneously (by for example, using feed-in tariffs and other incentives on renewable 
energy to create more jobs) is in these terms a good example of a radical green energy politics, 
because it has the potential to mobilize a range of constituencies - from militant eco-activists to bill-
conscious suburban householders - around a programme that would actually shift power 
dramatically away from major corporations (the energy producers), distributing it amongst a much 
wider population.  
 
We are arguing, then, that for a politics to be radical means that it is a politics which is pushing for 
redistributions and reconfigurations of power on a number of levels; that it is a politics which is 
sensitive to its environment, and that it works with a sound contextual understanding of the 
‘ecology’ it is part of; and that it is a politics works on a strategic level, pushing for real, and long-
term, change rather than for short-term spectacular effect. The Green New Deal is a potential site of 
such a strategic politics,especially if it can be linked to a real popularisation of domestic renewable 
energy-generation, because it threatens to tackle a major social issue by mobilising a broad 
constituency of support and permanently weakening the massive, entirely undemocratic power of 
the electricity-generating companies. This is one strong example of what radicalism could mean in 
the 21
st
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